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IFS,  THOUGH,  AND BECAUSE*  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Everybody knows that if and because 1 are related conjunctions. 
Goodman (1954, p. 14) takes Because A B to be equivalent o its 
"contrapositive", the subjunctive conditional statement If -1B then 
~A 2, and Ryle (1963, p. 317) sees at least a truth conditional equality 
between Because A B and the subjunctive conditional statement If ~A 
then ~B.  The common belief, I think, is already found in Ramsey 
(1931, p. 248), who mentions I fp  then q and Because pq in the same 
breath stating "because is merely a variant on if when p is known to be 
true". Beginners in philosophy can already learn much the same from 
Blau's highly esteemed propaedeutics (1982, 1983, p. 43, my trans- 
lation): "Closely related to if, are the partial truth functional operators 
because, since, hence, therefore, etc. It seems to me they are essentially 
the conjunction of A and if A then B." I would like to call the view of 
Ramsey and Blau the mainstream analysis of the relationship between 
because and if (in the following, "Mainstream Analysis"). 
Nobody knows the exact relationship between if and because. This is 
strikingly documented by the difference in attention that has been paid 
to if and because in modern philosophy. Whereas if has gained 
abundant care by the meanwhile proliferating conditional logics 
because has remained in the shadows. 
I think we should do more justice to because and shall venture a 
parallel analysis of both conjunctions. In approaching this I won't 
prematurely commit myself to one of the views mentioned above. 
Instead I want to start with the idea that because always points to a 
reason or an explanation. In the next section, the basic ideas of three 
promising accounts of conditionals, reasons, and explanations are cited. 
The common feature of these accounts is that they rely on the beliefs of 
an epistemic subject. In section 3, I shall describe the simple model of 
beliefs to be used for my analysis. In section 4, the suggested analysis of 
conditionals (viz., the Ramsey test) is found to be inadequate in the light 
of the Mainstream Analysis, which points to a modification, viz., to the 
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Strong Ramsey test, as I call it. Then - in section 5 - the mentioned 
accounts of reasons and explanations are put together, and an alter- 
native analysis of because results. My claim in section 6 is that this 
analysis is at the same time an analysis of i[ by giving rise to the 
definition of a universal (pro-)conditional not realized in natural 
language. In a rather straightforward way, a universal contra-con- 
ditional and a universal unconditional can be introduced, too. Section 7 
lists a handful of general theses on the arrangement of natural an- 
guage's indicative and subjunctive i[, i f . . .  might, even if, though, and 
because within the framework of universal conditionals. In section 8, 
the relatively complicated acceptability conditions of the natural con- 
junctions are reduced to handy formulations by working up the 
accessory conditions concerning the acceptance of "antecedents" and 
"consequents". In doing so the original theses can be reassessed from 
the perspective of the final conditions. In the last section, theoretical 
prospects and practical limitations of my analysis are outlined. 
I would like to close this introduction with a word about principles. 
There are well-founded doubts as to whether it is suitable to assign truth 
values to conditionals. In accordance with these doubts, my starting 
point will lead us to epistemic interpretations, and the model I shall 
employ is a framework for acceptability conditions and not for truth 
conditions. So far a benevolent reader may accept his line of reasoning. 
Several points of the following, however, will be subject o fundamental 
criticism. Some will prefer to consign the relevance condition embodied 
in the Strong Ramsey test, as well as the accessory conditions for the 
acceptance of antecedents and consequents to the realm of pragmatics 
and assertability conditions where Gricean mechanisms are assumed to 
be at work. I agree with this criticism but I am confident that this slight 
haziness will not prove pernicious. 3 On the contrary, the integration of 
some rather strong considerations with a pragmatic flavour into the 
acceptability conditions is done to bring about a simultaneous treat- 
ment of the ifs, though, and because. The success of the undertaking 
may be judged by its results. 
2. THE POINT  OF  DEPARTURE 
In the beginning there is the hope that three exemplary accounts of 
conditionals, explanations, and reasons, all of them well-grounded in
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the pertinent special discussions, can be combined to a unified analysis 
of if and because. 
One of the more prominent suggestions how to interpret conditionals 
has Ramsey (1931, p. 247, note 7) as its progenitor and Stalnaker as its 
initial advocate in conditional logic. Here is the Ramsey test, in 
Stalnaker's (1968, p. 102) original formulation: 
(1) This is how to evaluate a conditional: 
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of 
beliefs; second, make whatever adjustments are required to 
maintain consistency (without modyfying the hypothetical 
belief in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the 
consequent is then true. 
A main problem of the philosophy of science is that of (scientific) 
explanation. The merits of the following suggestion of G/irdenfors 
(1980, p. 404) can be found in G/irdenfors' original paper and in 
Stegmiiller (1983, ch. XI); I can only give its idea here: 
(2) The central criterion on an explanation is that the explanans 
in a non-trivial way increases the belief-value of the 
explanandum, where the belief-value of a sentence is 
determined from the given knowledge situation. 
Finally, Spohn (1983) argues convincingly that a theory of causality is 
best based on the notion of reason. Spohn's (1983, p. 372) explication of 
"reason" is quite simple: 
(3) A is a reason for B for the person X at time s iff X's 
believing A at s would raise the epistemic rank of B for X at 
time s. 
An account of causation would be due now. I think, however, that it 
would hardly help us to achieve our object. On the one hand, Spohn has 
already shown how to parallel the analysis of causes with the analysis of 
reasons. 4 On the other hand, causation appears to go beyond the limits 
of the epistemic setting necessary and sufficient to handle (1)-(3). So, if 
someone insists that because is positively about an asymmetric causal 
relation in our real world, I have to confess that I cannot give a 
satisfactory interpretation f this "causal" because. I shall concentrate 
on the "informative" because specifying just reasons. Yet I conjecture 
that this informative because is the more common and the more general 
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one, and that the causal because can eventually be characterized asa 
special case by a few non-epistemic conditions. 
3. THE MODEL 
A comparison of (1)-(3) provides encouragement for the present 
project: it is all a matter of belief. So we must have a model for states of 
belief. An appropriate model, designed for the analysis of conditionals, 
is investigated by G/irdenfors (1979, 1981, 1982, 1984a). We do not 
need his model in its full sophistication, but can be satisfied with a few 
very plausible conditions. 
First of all, we have to give a (idealized) representation f a state of 
belief in the form of the set of accepted sentences: 
(4) A belief set K is a set of sentences that contains all logically 
valid sentences and is closed under modus ponens. 
The object language and its logic can be left unspecified for the 
moment, except, that it should include classical propositional logic 
(with the symbols 7, A, V, D, _--).5 Note that the set of all sentences i  a 
belief set; it is called the absurd belief set and denoted K• 
Now we have to provide for the possible changes of beliefs. G/irden- 
fors (1979, pp. 391f; 1982, pp. 90-92) motivates the following 
definition for the case that the new sentence to be accepted oes not 
contradict the old stock of beliefs: 
(5) The expansion K~ of K by A is the set of logical con- 
sequences of K U {A}, i.e., K/~ = {B: A D B 9 K}. 
The label "expansion of K by A" is justified by the fact that KC K~ 
and A 9 K~,. Concerning the more delicate contractions and revisions 
of states of belief, I shall only have to make use of G~irdenfors' basic 
postulates for contraction and revision: 
(6) A set of sentences KA is a contraction of K with respect to A 
only if 
(C1) KA is a belief set, 
(C2) kA-=B~KA=K~,  
(ca) KA C K, 
(C4) I /A~Ar  KA, 
(C5) Ar  and 
(C6) A  9  K~K C_ (KA)~,. 
I FS ,  THOUGH,  AND BECAUSE 349 
(C6) is a principle of economy: make your changes of belief as minimal 
as possible. The reverse inclusion A 6 K~(K~)~ C_ K follows from 
(C3) and (5), and given (C1)-(C4), (C6) can be shown to be 
equivalent to the following condition (cf. G~irdenfors, 1982, pp. 93f): 
= (KA) .A .  (7) K~ K N - +
If a person has to accept (actually or hypothetically) a sentence, the 
negation of which he accepted before, expansions do not help. Gfirden- 
fors introduces revisions or minimal changes of belief as a generaliza- 
tion of both expansions and such belief-contravening changes. Here is 
his basic set of postutates: 
(8) A set of sentences KA is a revision of K needed to accept A 
only if 
(R1) KA is a belief set, 
(R2) ~- A ~ B ~ KA = KB, 
(R3) ~/--1A ~ KA r Kl, 
(R4) AcKA,  and 
(R5) -nA ~ K ~ KA= K+a. 
Note that the analogue to (C5), viz., 
(9) A e K ~ KA = K, 
is false for K = K• (unless A is contradictory), but immediately 
derivable from (R5) and (5) otherwise (resp., from (R4) in the case of a 
contradictory A). Henceforth, throughout this paper I shall presuppose 
that we are dealing only with non-absurd belief sets and sentences that 
are neither tautologies nor contradictions. 
Now, intuition suggests that revisions can be accomplished by a 
combination of contraction and expansion. This has become familiar 
as Levi's thesis: 
(10) KA = (K2~A)~. 
There is also the other way round, from revisions to contractions (cf. 
(7)): 
(11) K~ = K ffl K~A. 
To speak of (11) as the reversion of (10) has a good foundation; 
G~irdenfors (1982) proved the following relationship: 
(12) (C1)-(C6) & (10) r (R1)-(R5) & (11). 
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An implication of which we will make regular use is: 
(13) BCKA& BeK~A~BeK.  
I'd like to prove this. From (10), we have 
B e KA 0 K=A = (KS~A)~, f') (KA)+~A C K~, CI K+~A, 
since K' c_ K" implies K~ -+ ~_ Kb + for every sentence C (monotonicity 
of expansions); therefore, with (5), ADBe K & ~ADBe K, and 
B e K by definition (4) (and also, by (11), B e K2 and B e KZ~A; the 
reader may also verify the complementary implication B d Ka & 
Br  K~A~ Be  K). 
Perhaps you noticed that we had to use the indefinite article in the 
first lines of (6) and (8), for there is no unique KA or KA singled out by 
(C1)-(C6) or (RI)-(R5) respectively. However, (1)-(3) seem to 
presuppose uniqueness in changing states of belief. How this multi- 
plicity can be eliminated isanalysed in G~rdenfors (1984a) with the aid 
of a relation of epistemic importance. In the sequel I shall take it for 
granted that there is a unique way to contract or revise a belief set with 
respect to a given sentence, i.e., that there are functions (K, A) ~ K7~, 
and (K, A) ~ Ka. 
4.  THE MAINSTREAM ANALYS IS  INDICATES THE R IGHT WAY 
The model just sketched out was developed by G~irdenfors to analyse 
conditionals, and the Ramsey test (1) is easily translated into the 
language of belief sets. For that purpose we provisionally add the 
non-truth functional conditional > to our object language: 
(14) A> Be  K C:~ B~ KA. 
This formulation of the Ramsey test, together with (R1)-(R5) and two 
further postulates for revisions, gives exactly Lewis' (1973a) "official" 
logic VC for conditionals (el. G~irdenfors, 1979). Particularly, (9) 
yields 
(15) A, BeK=>A>BeK.  
But it is immediately clear now that the Mainstream Analysis must fail 
in this setting. Symbolizing because by ~>,6 the Mainstream Analysis 
reads thus, in Ramsey's and Blau's versions respectively: 
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(16) A~K~(A~>BeK c:~ A>B~K) ,  
(17) A">B~KC:~A~K&A>BcK.  
Using (15), (16) and (17) both validate 
(18) A, BeK~A~>B~K,  
which is obviously absurd. 
What can one do about this then? At present I don't want to 
repudiate the Mainstream Analysis; so we have to tackle the problem at 
(15). Does mere acceptance of A and B really justify the acceptance of
If A B? Consider the sentence 
If Anthony goes to the party Bette will go to the party. 
Would you accept this conditional sentence if you knew that both 
Anthony and Bette go to the party but that Bette's sympathy for 
Anthony has changed into a strong dislike, so that Anthony's presence 
was almost reason enough for Bette to stay at home? I am sure you 
would not. Except for logical puzzles in the weekend issues of preten- 
tious newspapers conditionals in natural language do express some 
connection between the antecedent and the consequent. (Later on I will 
argue that this is not the only reason for using though instead of if in the 
sentence above to describe the affairs concerning Anthony and Bette.) 
Adhering to the model of Section 3, I see only one possibility to 
undercut (15): we have to change (14) in such a way that the mere belief 
in A and B does not make the right-hand side t rue]  I believe the right 
method to attack the problem is to strengthen (14) to the following 
condition. We will term it the Strong Ramsey test and associate a new 
symbol ~> with it: 
(19) A,>BeKC~BeKA&Bf~K~A.  
Substituting ~> for >, the Mainstream Analysis yields a fairly plausible 
condition in the critical situation A, B ~ K: 
(20) A "> B e K c=~ B r K~A, provided that A, B ~ K. 
Considering the fact that the Ramsey test was contrived for counter- 
factual conditionals in the first place, it is satisfying that the Strong 
Ramsey test reduces to the ordinary one in the presumptive context of 
counterfactuals (this can be seen immediately by applying (13)): 
(21) A~>B~Kr  A>B 9  provided that BCK.  
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Thus (19) is a promising approach to both if and because. 8 >> seems to 
be more adequate fornatural language conditionals than >, because it
explicitly requires the antecedent to be positively relevant for the 
consequent. Suppose Anthony did not go to the party; then Bette would 
go there all the sooner; thus the Strong Ramsey test fails, and we do not 
accept he conditional in question - in agreement with our intuition. 
We may test alternative ideas to block (15). One should be aware that 
the conception of relevance cannot be captured adequately if we try to 
simplify the right hand side of (19) to B e KA & B r K.  This would 
produce absurd consequences contrary to those of (18): it would be 
impossible to accept A a>B if A is accepted, according to the 
Mainstream Analysis (16), and already if A or B is accepted, according 
to the Mainstream Analysis (17). Another method to prevent the 
acceptance of A and B from forcing the acceptance of I f  A B is to 
contract he original belief set before the Ramsey test (14) is applied. 
Contraction with respect to A will not do, since (KA)A = gA (if A c K, 
apply (10), (C3), and (C6); if A d K, apply (C5)). But B e (K~)A fares 
better as a candidate for the acceptability condition of A > B c K: it 
has no obvious defects, and, though it is scarcely motivated as yet, we 
will return to its idea from another direction in the next section. 
G~irdenfors (1981, pp. 209f) analyses might conditionals in the spirit 
of the Ramsey test, too. Writing A ~ B for I f  A,  B might be, his 
suggestion is
(22) A O B e K C:~ -I B C KA. 
A stronger version analogous to the Strong Ramsey test is 
(23) AO>B~K Cr ) - -7BCKA&-3BeK-~A.  
Some connections may clear up the picture: 
(24) A 9  
(25) A ~ > B e K C:~ -7 A >> -T B ~ K , 
(26) A~BcKCC,  A>BcK&- -7AO-~BeK,  
(27) A 9  
It was a merit of the Mainstream Analysis that we have found the 
Strong Ramsey test (19) for conditionals. Alas, further down (in 
sections 7 and 8) I reject the Mainstream Analysis. Moreover (in the 
next two sections), I argue that a careful examination of the meaning of 
because requires a slightly more complicated interpretation of con- 
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ditionals than the Strong Ramsey test. This interpretation is - in 
contrast to (19) - also a natural stepping-stone to the acceptance 
conditions of other kinds of conditionals and though. 
5. AN ALTERNATIVE  ANALYS IS  OF  BECAUSE 
My proposition is that Because A B is synonymous with "A  is a 
reason or an explanation for B." (I want to leave aside causation (see 
section 2), justification, argumentation, and facilitation of understand- 
ing, which involve problems of a different kind.) In following that line 
we have to discuss (2) and (3), and work out a general acceptability 
condition for because sentences. For fear that further analysis would be 
blocked I shall rest content with necessary conditions in this section. 
Starting with reasons, we may assume that the function of Spohn's 
personal and temporal indices is taken over by the belief sets in our 
model, and epistemic ranks are now mirrored by the elementship n the 
belief sets in question. So, as a first attempt, (3) can be transcribed into 
(28) Aa>BEK~(BEKA&BCK)  vs ( -nBCKA&~BEK) .  
This, however cannot be correct. First, a reason A can already be 
known and still be a reason; but in (28), A~ K= KA leads to 
Aa> B ~ K. We can take account of this shortcoming by employing 
the Strong Ramsey test (19): 
(29) A">B~K: : :~(BeKA&BCK-~A)  
v! (-1B ~ KA& ~B ~ K~A) 
r A~ Be  K v/ A O> Be  K.  9 
Note that in the case of A, B c K the necessary condition for A a> B 
K reduces to -n A > B r K, according to (29). 
Second, a consequence B can already be known and still be a 
consequence; but in (28), B ~ K leads to A a> B CK. An obvious 
possibility to avoid this mistake of (28) is 
(30) A'~>BEK~(BC(KB)A&BCK~)v(~Br  
& ~Bc K~). 
(30) makes use of the alternative idea to escape (15) which is mentioned 
above. Note that in the case of --7 B ~ K the necessary condition for 
A "> B ~ K reduces to A > B ~ KB, according to (30). 
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It is easily seen that (29), although proposed to deal with the first 
problem, solves the second as well, and (30), although proposed to deal 
with the second problem, solves the first. Thus we are at a loss for a 
criterion whether to favour (29) or (30) as an analysis of because. 
Fortunately a closer examination of explanations shows both ideas to be 
substantial. Consider (2) and note that in the "given knowledge 
situation" of an explanation the explanandum is known. So the expli- 
cation of explanation given by G/irdenfors (1980, cf. also Stegmiiller, 
1983) must be written 
(31) Aa>B~K~(B~KA&BCK)  v / ( -nBCKA&- IB~K) .  
A first familiar argument comes to mind: since we do not want to rule 
out the possibility A ~ K, we must replace K by K,A:  
(32) Aa> B~KB~(BcKA&B~K~A)  
v / (~B ~ K A d(Z - l  B c K ~ A ) 
<4, A >> B ~ K v/ A ~ > B ~ K. 
There is a more important problem. G/irdenfors, and also Stegmiiller, 
apparently want to take K to be the last belief set before the surprising 
explanandum has come to one's knowledge, i.e., before the actual 
situation KB. But this is an unwarranted simplification. Think of the 
bomber pilot who racks his brain about the question why he pressed the 
button then, decades ago - he doesn't acknowledge the norms of those 
days any more. Astronomers may well search for an explanation of a 
strange phenomenon known since Tycho Brahe's observations - 
nevertheless, nobody wants to go back to a belief state of the 16th 
century. Scientific revolutions sometimes produce a demand for 
explanation of facts that were regarded as self-evident up until then. l~ 
Summing up, the step from KB back to K is by no means a trivial one. 
So much the better that we can already account for that problem by 
making use of contractions: 11
(33) Aa>B~K~(Be(K~)A&Br  
v / (~B r (K~)A & -TB ~ (K~)~A) 
r A~ B~ KBv/ A 9 B~ K~. 
This is my first claim: (33) is a (relatively, see below) conclusive analysis 
of because sentences. Be aware that (33), by combining the provisions 
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of (29) and (30), guarantees that accepting A and/or 13 does not 
prejudge acceptance or rejection of Because A B. ~2 
6. UNIVERSAL  CONDIT IONALS 
My second claim is more far-reaching than the first: (33) is to be the 
central idea for a viable analysis of the whole field of natural anguage 
marked out by the ifs, though, and because. I shall postulate a basis of 
universal conditionals that are not realized in natural language. To 
indicate this conception assumed in the mind but not in the dictionary 
I'll use the arrow ~ instead of >. 
(33) is already perfect for the analysis of what you can call a 
"conditional connection". For the purpose of the introduction of the 
universal (pro-)conditional---~ the implication of (33) can be streng- 
thened to an equivalence: 
(34) A- -~BeKCz~A>>BeKBwAO>BeKB.  t3 
In following discussions we will call the first disjunct of the right-hand 
side the D-version of --~, and the second disjunct the O-version of -~. 
To deal with connectives like though, we will need some picture of 
"the contrary" < of a conditional connection, that is to say, an 
interpretation for conjunctions indicating a somehow counteractive 
connection. There are two immediate possibilities, and I cannot hink of 
a criterion to decide which of the two is the better: 
(35) 
(36) 
A - -< Be  K r -7A>> Be K~ v /~A 9  Be  K~. 
A --< Be  K r A >> -~ B e K ~3 v/ A O > -T B e K ~. 
Fortunately, as is easily verified through application of (19) and (23), 
(35) and (36) are equivalent, with the respective D-versions and 
O-versions changing r61es. As a convention, 1 take (35) as the standard 
formulation for reference when speaking of D-versions and 9 
sions, TM and call --< the universal contra-conditional. As is desirable, 
A - -~BcK and A- -<BeK cannot hold at the same time - it is 
impossible for A to be simultaneously positively and negatively rele- 
vant for B. Of course, there is a third possibility: A need neither 
promote nor handicap B - they can be disconnected. This state of 
affairs brings into the mind the universal unconditional -~, which can be 
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put: 
(37) A~BcK C:> A- ->B~K&A- -<B~K.  
This completes the disjoint and exhaustive set of universal conditionals 
that underlie the variety of actually realized natural anguage con- 
ditionals. 
7.  NATURAL LANGUAGE CONDIT IONALS - THESES 
In speaking of natural language conditionals ! would like to include ijf, 
if . . . .  might, and even if, all of them with the indicative mood as well as 
with the subjunctive mood (these are "the i[s"), though, and because 
(both only with the indicative mood, naturally), is I refer to the 
subordinate clause as the "antecedent" and to the main clause as the 
"consequent" in the relevant complex sentences. 
These, now, are my theses on natural language conditionals: 
(38) Natural language conditionals are about acceptance in belief 
states. 
(39) Natural anguage conditionals are about acceptance of uni- 
versal conditionals ("principal conditions") and about ac- 
ceptance of the corresponding antecedents and consequents 
("accessory conditions"). 
(40) If and because are realizations of the universal pro-con- 
ditional; though is a realization of the universal contra- 
conditional; even if is a realization of the universal un- 
conditional. 16
(41) Realizations of the universal pro-conditional re accepted 
only if the acceptance status of the antecedent and the 
consequent are equal; realizations of the universal contra- 
conditional and unconditional are accepted only if the 
consequent is accepted. 
(42) Because and though are accepted only if the antecedent is 
accepted; the i/s are accepted only if the antecedent is not 
accepted, and it is the grammatical mood that indicates the 
exact acceptance status of the antecedent. ~7 
8.  NATURAL LANGUAGE CONDIT IONALS - DETAILED 
EXPOSIT ION 
For the sake of simplicity and conciseness, (38)-(42) were not presented 
as an explicit analysis of the natural language conditionals. They 
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require some justification. Let me try to supply some support by giving 
the acceptability conditions separately and checking their con- 
sequences. 
Starting with the conditional in the narrowest sense, viz., if, I have to 
defend three rather controversial hypotheses. First, as to (42), why 
shouldn't we accept both A and l,f A 13? I hope you concede that we 
would also accept 13 in that situation. My answer then is that we either 
assume a "conditional connection" between A and 13, then we have to 
accept 13ecause A 13 (since we actually accept A and 13), or we assume 
no conditional connection, in which case we have to accept either 
Though A 13 (if A is adverse to 13) or cannot accept more than the 
inexpressive conjunction A and 13 (if A is irrelevant o 13). But we do 
not accept If A 13, for this would imply ignorance of A and a positive 
connection between A and 13. Let me emphasize that the difference in 
the acceptance status of the antecedent as laid down in (42) is exactly 
the argument the Mainstream Analysis falls victim to. 
Second, as to (42), isn't it shown conclusively by Adams' famous 
Kennedy example that a joint analysis of indicative and subjunctive 
conditionals i impossible? For, as Adams and many others claim, we all 
accept 
(43) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone lse did. 
and, simultaneously, 
(44) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then Kennedy could still 
be alive. 
But precisely this I bluntly deny. If you accept (43), then you do not 
believe to know Kennedy's murderer; but if you accept (44), then you 
do: it was Oswald, in your opinion. And, of course, both epistemic 
commitments are mutually exclusive. Only our uncertainty whether we 
should know that Oswald killed Kennedy gives the example its per- 
suasive power: (43) induces a context where we - like the police 
inspector setting about his investigations - are ignorant of the assailant, 
while (44) at once arranges the scene so that we - well-informed by the 
med ia -  are aware of the facts. ~8 
Third, as to (41), aren't here counter-examples to the claim that the 
antecedent and the consequent of a realization of the universal pro- 
conditional must be of equal acceptance status? Remember Bette who 
doesn't like Anthony any more. The critical case is the following. 
Suppose you know that Anthony comes to the party but you don't have 
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any idea whether Bette plans to show up. It seems you can accept 
If Anthony stayed at home, Bette would go to the party. 
However, I think it may well be that someone would protest: "Now, it 
ain't a settled affair at all that Bette isn't going to the party." Thereupon 
you have to be more precise about what you really meant: 
If Anthony stayed at home, Bette certainly would go to the 
party. 
And you have a consequent whose negation you accept. 
As a result of (40)-42), if (with either mood) is the only natural 
language conditional where the consequent is not accepted. This brings 
about that if is the only natural anguage conditional with a 9 
to be analysed separately. In all other cases it would be pointless to 
apply a might-operator to the consequent - you already accept it. If a 
might is really found in the consequent, it can be conceived as an 
integral part of that consequent. 
At last we are able to explicitly specify the acceptability conditions of 
indicative and subjunctive conditionals. In the sequel 1 use variants of 
--~ instead of > to mark the distinction between this analysis based on 
universal conditionals and that of sections 4 and 5. I am sorry to say that 
due to the explicit ~-versions needed there is another intermediate 
stage not realized in natural anguage: 
(45) A ~ B c K ez> A --> B e K & A,  -1A, B , -q B ~ K . 
(46) A' - ->B~K~A- ->BcK&~A,~BEK.  
One arrives at the natural anguage if by taking the []-version of --* and 
at the natural language i f . . .  might by taking the 9 of --->; of 
course, o___> is the indicative ~9 and '---~ is the subjunctive case: 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
AoO---.> B e K ca 
A "C]---> B ~ K ca 
A>> BE K~& A , -qA ,  B,-qBq~ K 
AD BE K & A ,~A,B , -1Be  K. 
A  9  B~ K~& A,  TA ,  B ,~Be K 
-q A D -n B E K & A, -1A, B, -1B r K. 
A>> B~ K~&-nA, -qB~ K 
B E KA & ~A, -nB  ~ K. 
A'~----> Bc  K r A~> BE K~& ~A,~Be K 
r ~B~ KA &- IA ,  ~BE K. 
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One can easily show that the upper lines of (47-(50) reduce to the final 
lower lines (using particularly (C5), (R5), (9), and the fact that belief 
sets are closed under tautological implication). I don't want to discuss 
these results here; in any case, a good deal of justification for (47), (49) 
and (50) is given in Giirden[ors (1981). 20 
The last pro-conditional to be looked at is because. Following the 
above-mentioned argument, we don't have to keep apart he []-version 
and O-version and can proceed to the natural language a___~ in one step: 
(51) Aa- -~BcK C~ A-~BcK&A,  BcK  
r (B ~ (KB)A V! ~ B ~ (KB)~A)  • A, B ~ K. 
The simplification is done by (13) and (C3). It is illuminating to consider 
cases with regard to the retention of A in K~. In the case of A c K~, 
one immediately sees that the U-version is impossible (because of (9) 
and (C4)), and there remains the condition of the O-version to be 
considered. In the case of A ~ K~, on the contrary, the O-version 
is obviously satisfied (R5) and ~AD-qB~ K~= K U K~B, since 
Ae  K and ~Bc  K~B); therefore, Ar K~ can only come to pass in a 
nontrivial way if the El-version is intended, the acceptability condition 
of which can be transformed to A D B c K~ (by (C3) and (R5)), or 
equivalently -1A c K~ B (by contraposition f the material implication, 
(5) and (10)). 
We pause for a moment to see if our analysis can give some correct 
predictions. Recall Anthony and Bette, again, and take for granted that 
both will go to the party and that Carl will be present, oo (Bette has got 
an eye on Carl now). We accept 
It is not because Anthony goes to the party that Bette goes 
to the party. 
It appears correct o symbolize this by -a(A ~---~ B) e K, which implies 
A ~---~ B r K, that is 
(52) (B r (K-B)A V/ B e (K~)~,a) 
& (-1B r (K~)~A v/-q B e (K~),0. 
Let's check the intuitive adequacy of this theoretical prediction. 
Suppose we didn't know of Bette's decision to attend the festivity. 
Would we consequently drop our conviction that Anthony goes to the 
party? Certainly we would not, since Anthony's presence is at best 
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irrelevant, probably even adverse to Bette's presence, i.e., it increases 
the credibility of our very supposition. Thus A e Ka,  (K~)A = K~, and 
the first term of (52) holds by (C4), while the last term contradicts 
-7Br  K (by (C3)). We have to maintain 7Br But, given 
ignorance as to Bette's plans, the assumption that Anthony stayed away 
will by no means establish Bette's absence, and we are done. 
Compare this with the real motive of Bette's presence: 
Because Carl goes to the party, Bette goes to the party. 
This, being the antithesis of the foregoing sentence of our party chatter, 
is usually taken to mean that the antecedent necessitates the con- 
sequent. Doubts about Bette's presence would also entail doubts about 
Carl's presence, and in contrast o Anthony's case we intuitively have 
C r K~. And this is exactly what the present analysis has foretold for 
the l~-version of a__~ 
We now switch over to contra-conditionals. Keep the example and 
suppose that Bette used to be anxious not to cross a disappointed 
admirer's path. We accept 
Though Anthony goes to the party, Bette goes to the party. 
Here we definitely expect A~ K~ - why exclude a belief from a 
contraction if that very belief makes the contraction more plausible? It 
is pleasing that our analysis predicts this as well. Taking a__< as a 
symbol for though, the analysis according to (40)-(42) runs as follows: 
(53) Aa- - -<B~KC~A- - -<B~K&A,  BI~K 
r (B ~ (K~)~A V/-7B ~ (K~)A) & A, B E K. 
The simplification is again done by (13) and (C3). Assume for the sake 
of argument that A r K~. Then the C]-version amounts to ~A 3 B e 
K~C K-~B; since -7Be  K-~B it follows that Ac  K~B and also Ae  
K~ = K 17 K~B, in contradiction to the assumption. The O-version 
implies that 7B r (K~)~A (otherwise, by (13), -7B c K~ C K which is 
incompatible with B e K ~: K• According to our assumption this 
amounts to ~B r (K~)+~A, i,e., 7A  D -TB r K~. But A c K and -1Be  
K~a,  so AvTBe Kf-I K~B = K~ by (11), and we have a contradic- 
tion. Hence we have gained the intuitively desired result A e K~. But 
now we see at once that the O-version of a~ is self-defeating: it comes 
out at 7 B e K~ which is forbidden by (C3) and the accessory condition 
B e K. Thus the sole principal condition for though is B ~ (K~)=A. 
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One would suppose that even if is the contra-conditional in the case 
of an antecedent that is not accepted. Let me show why this is illusory. 
On the basis of the foregoing theses and simplifications you will have no 
difficulty in checking the following conditions. I use o__< and respec- 
tively r:__< for the supposed indicative and subjunctive ven if: 
(54) A ~ B c K Cr> A- -< B e K & A, ~ A f~ K & B e K 
r ~AD Bc  K-B& A ,~Ar  K & Be  K 
r Ae  K-~B& A, TA~ K & Be  K. 
(55) Ar - -<BeK C~ A- - -<BeK&-TA,  BeK 
(B e ( K~)=A v/-7B e ( K-B)A) 
&-7A,  Be  K. 
Some comments are in order. As to o_.<, the <>-version leads to a 
contradiction, sothat the principal condition of the D-version remains; 
while the second line of (54) looks rather plausible, the third line, which 
is in fact equivalent to the second, is intuitively too strong. For instance, 
imagine yourself being ignorant of Anthony's but sure about Bette's 
going to the party and accept 
Even if Anthony goes to the party, Bette will go to the party. 
However, on the hypothetical condition that Bette didn't come, you 
would not exchange your ignorance about Anthony for the belief that 
he would attend the party. For, from the premises of this example, his 
presence could not prevent Bette from going to the party. 
As to r_._<, there is perfect symmetry with the situation about 
because. In the case of ~A e K~, we immediately recognize that the 
[]-version is impossible, and there remains the condition for the 
<~-version. In the case of ~ A ~ K~, the ~-version isobviously satisfied, 
and the D-version reduces to -7A D B e K~, or equivalently A e K~B. 
In fact, comparing (55) with (51), one realizes that At--< Be  K is 
equivalent to -7 A a___~ B e K. This definitely shows that, without further 
refinements, '---< cannot even be a partial explication of the subjunc- 
tive even if: 
Even if Anthony went to the party, Bette would go to the 
party. 
and 
Because Anthony doesn't go to the party, Bette goes to the 
party. 
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are by no means synonymous but, on the contrary, appear to have 
mutually exclusive acceptability conditions. 
What, then, can we learn from this situation? It seems that contra- 
conditionals are not the only device for communicating a counteractive 
connection. The even if of natural language, though frequently indicat- 
ing such a counteractive connection, is not a contra-conditional, for the 
adverse circumstances mentioned in the antecedent are not effective 
enough to overcome the belief in the consequent. The consequent is
accepted unconditionally, and even if is an unconditional. To prepare 
the analysis of unconditionals, we shall give the basic idea (37) a more 
convenient shape: 
(56) A- IBe  K r A---~B~ K& A- -< B~ K 
(B ~ (K~) A r B E (K~)~A) & 
(-~B ~ (K~)A r 7B  E (K~)~A) 
r B r (KB)A & B f~ (K~)~A & 
(-1B e (K~)A r B e (K~)-~A). 
The theses (40)-(42) finally yield the following acceptability conditions 
for the indicative and subjunctive ven if, which are symbolized by ~ 1 
and '-~ respectively: 
(57) A~ C:> A~BeK&A, -nACK&BeK 
r ADB, -nAD Br  K~& A ,~Ar  K& Be  K 
r A ,~Ar  K~B& A ,~Ar  K& Be  K. 
(58) A r -~ B e K ~e~ A -~ B E K & -I A, B c K 
<=~ B, -sB  r (K~)A & - IA,  Be  K. 
Observe that due to the common accessory condition B e K, in (57) 
and (58) A-- t B c K reduces to B, -nB ~ (K~)A, (K~)~A. As to (57), 
the simplification is done by (R5), (5), contraposition of the material 
implication, (C6), and (10). As to (58), verify that -TA ~ K~ leads to a 
contradiction. The implication of -~A~ K~, though not completely 
implausible, is certainly a very strong stipulation. I suppose that we 
have to penitently resume the examination of (55) for the analysis of 
even if, trying to avoid the absurd equivalence to a because clause with 
negated antecedent, perhaps by distinguishing normal and exceptional 
cases with regard to the acceptance status of A in K~. But this is too 
sophisticated and questionable a matter to be treated here. 
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1 don't know of a natural anguage realization of the unconditional in
which the antecedent and the consequent are accepted. For the sake of 
completeness, however, we list the acceptability condition: 
(59) A" - tBeKC~A- - - tBeK&A,  BcK  
r B,  -1B  qL ( K ~ ) ~ A & A ,  Be  K . 
It is obvious that A" -~ B c K is equivalent o ~Ar -~ B 6 K. This 
gives rise to speculation as to why a ] is not realized: it is because of the 
economy of natural anguage. Ignoring the above-mentioned suspicion, 
exactly the same reason applies to r__< (remember, A '~ B c K r 
-1A a--~ Bc  K). On the other hand, I am not so sure about the 
non-existence of o__< in natural anguage (remember, (54) just yielded 
an acceptability condition which is too strong). There is some evidence 
that the indicative even if is best caught by a disjunctive combination of 
o__~ and o___<, which leads to the acceptability condition A D 
B r K~, or equivalently ~ A ~ K~R. 21 
The formal results of my theses are summarized synoptically in 
table I. 
9. PROSPECTS 
I believe work has to proceed in two directions. The first is with respect 
to the theoretical modelling of states of belief. There are two important 
ways to give a more informative picture of belief states: probability 
functions (the old Bayesian way), and the so-called ordinal conditional 
functions (the new method of Spohn, 1986). Both ways admit plausible 
definitions of expansions, contractions, and revisions in such a way that 
Levi's thesis can be proven. As to the probabilistic approach, ac- 
ceptance can be identified with probability assignment of 1, but then we 
have to provide for conditionalization on zero antecedents. Another 
possibility would be to postulate that the probabilities of all contingent 
sentences lie strictly between 0 and 1, and to take sufficiently high 
probability as acceptance, getting on with generalized conditionaliza- 
tion in Jeffrey's manner, again with weighting parameters trictly 
between 0 and 1. However, we must put up with the loss of logical 
closure of the set of accepted sentences, as the lottery paradox shows. 
This flaw is avoided by Spohn's ordinal conditional functions, the 
dynamics of which make use of a safety-parameter, too. A problem 
revealed by both probability functions and conditional functions is that 
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because cannot  be captured complete ly  by the dis junct ion of if and 
i f . . .  might as suggested in (33); it seems that we will need a condit ional  
of the form i f . . .  rather, or something similar. 
The  second direct ion invest igat ion should [ollow is a more  pract ical  
one. To  be sure, my procedure  is a top-down approach,  based on ideas 
of phi losophy (especial ly, phi losophy of science). For  a genuine analysis 
of natural  anguage,  which must proper ly  be bot tom-up,  one has to test 
whether  the results presented in sect ion 8 are adequate  to the current  
use of the ifs, though, and because. In part icular ,  the logic of my natural  
language condit ionals  has to be subjected to a thorough examinat ion.  I 
have become suspicious that misfits and fal lacies may eventual ly  make 
clear the need to consider  a pragmat ic  re levance relat ion,  which plays a 
r61e in natural  language condit ionals,  over  and above the epistemic 
re levance relat ion I 've  been riding around upon since the introduct ion 
of the Strong Ramsey test (19). 22 
Be that as it may, 1 contend that any condit ional  logic should be able 
to comfortab ly  come to terms with even if, though, and because. At any 
rate, my analysis has g iven an answer to the quest ion of the exact  
relat ionship between if and because. The Mainstream Analysis  was 
re jected on account  of (42). And  my theses have de l ivered the result 
that the F l -vers ion of Because A B (probably the vers ion normal ly  
intended) is equivalent  to the subjunct ive or "counter factua l "  con-  
dit ional  sentence If -1B ~ A. Thus,  despite similarit ies in the titles, I 
would l ike to re ject  Ryle 's  uggest ion and prefer  that of Goodman.  23 
NOTES 
* I am grateful to Peter G/irdeniors and Wolfgang Spohn for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper and to William Finnoff for correcting my English. 
I treat since as a synonym of because. 
2 Accordingly, Goodman calls because (in fact, he chooses since) the "factual con- 
ditional". 
3 The only instance where it seems undeniable that I give assertability conditions nstead 
of acceptability conditions i the indicative might conditional (cf. note 20). It might be 
instructive to reat my accessory conditions as presuppositions ( ot as conjuncts of the 
acceptability conditions as I treat hem) and try to carry through reductions analogous to 
section 8. 
4 Roughly, his final suggestion (Spohn 1983, p.388) says: a proposition A is a direct cause 
of a proposition B (in the actual world w~) iff A and B are true (in wo), A is temporally 
prior to B, and, given the obtaining circumstances (in wo), A is a reason for B, The 
obtaining circumstances are taken to be the whole history of the real world up to B, 
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except he "factor" which A belongs to. A major problem to be solved is how to get from 
direct causes to causes. 
5 By contrast, the corresponding symbolic abbreviations of the metalanguage are 7 ,  &, 
w, ~ ,  and r 
The reader should not be deterred from reading further by the following symbol 
menagerie. The taxonomy is simple. Arrows > mark preliminary analyses of natural 
language conditionals, arrows ~ ( resp . ,~ ,  -I), introduced in section 6, mark (speci- 
alizations of) universal conditionals. A superscript placed before an arrow is to indicate 
the acceptance status of the antecedent: ,,a,, stands for "accepted", ' "  for "rejected", 
and ..... for "open". Lastly, sometimes subspecies are classified with the help of the box [] 
and the diamond 9 
7 Further and perhaps more striking reason to abandon (14) is adduced by a recent 
theorem of Giirdenfors (1984b) implying that (14) together with (R5) leads to triviality. 
Of course, due to the strength of (19), the logic of -> is rather poor. For reasons given in 
later sections, I think that the logics of rEF-+, ~ a__~, etc., are far more important and 
interesting than that of the connective interpreted by the Strong Ramsey test alone. It is 
surprising that the double pragmatization (relevance plus accessory conditions) reduces 
to principal conditions often identical with the established semantic analyses. The 
triviality result of G~irdenfors (1984b) is prevented by the accessory conditions. 
At this juncture, it is interesting to compare the alternative analysis with what could be 
called the contribution of David Lewis to the analysis of because. He might say that 
Because A B is synonymous to B is causally dependent on A which for its part is explained 
thus (cf. Lewis, 1973b, p. 563, and his interpretation f counterfactuals in 1973a): 
A"> Be  K~ A> Be  K &- IA>- IB~ K 
<:~ B~ KA &-~B~ K~A 
r A>> Be  K & A~> Be  K. 
If (3) is intuitively adequate - and there is good evidence that it is - Lewis' explication is 
too strong for an analysis of because sentences. 
10 Cf. for instance Kuhn: "Through his [viz., Hauksbee's] researches..,  repulsion sud- 
denly became the fundamental manifestation f electrification, and it was then attraction 
that needed to be explained." (1962, pp. l16f), "Lavoisier's reform.. .ended by 
depriving chemistry of some actual and much potential explanatory power." (1962, p. 
106), and, more generally, "Changes in the standards governing permissible problems, 
concepts, and explanations can transform a science." (1962, p. 105, my interspacing) 
i i G~irdenfors indicates the use of contractions in explanatory contexts in (1980, p. 412; 
1981, p. 205; 1982, note 4, and 1984a, p. 139). 
~z If this argument from explanations couldn't convince yon of the necessity to take (33) 
instead of the simpler methods (29) or (30), you may be satisfied with the information that 
the latter don't yield a general analysis along the lines of sections 6 and 7. For example, 
(29) wouldn't admit of the acceptance of Though A B (the contra-conditional with 
A, B e K), while (30) would separate (35) from (36) and rule out indicative might 
conditionals. 
t3 You could try to drive the universalization still further by taking the symmetric 
(K b)=~ n instead of K b. Given my assumptions about natural language conditionals (see 
section 7), a difference would follow only for counterfactual conditionals. However, it is 
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(34) that will prove to be in a satisfactory accordance with the established interpretation 
of counterfactuals. 
14 The distinction between ~-versions and O-versions of contra-conditionals will 
eventually turn out superfluous in section 8. This rather justifies the uncertainty whether 
to take (35) or (36). 
lSMaybe we could include conjunctions like but and therefore, the former being to though 
as the latter to because. 
~6 I cannot think of a conjunction functioning as an unconditional when possible 
antecedents and consequents are accepted. Regarding the question whether even if might 
be a contra-conditional, see section 8. 
t7 This general statement eglects the fact that (even) if sometimes means (even) though 
and vice versa (consult the dictionaries); I may overemphasize the functional dis- 
criminations to some degree specially between contra-conditionals nd unconditionals. 
Since even if can be synonymously replaced by i f . . .  still (still in the main clause), it may 
be problematic to treat even if as a lexical unit at all. Furthermore I suppress the 
well-known observation that the grammatical mood may be misleading if the conditional 
is about future events; cf. Thomson and Martinet (1980, p. 188): "Sometimes, rather 
confusingly, type 2 [viz., subjunctive conditionals] can be used as an alternative to type 1 
[viz., indicative conditionals] for perfectly possible plans and suggestions." 
18 Similar examples can already be found in Ramsey (1931, p. 249) and Mackie (1962, p. 
71). I regard the process induced by these pairs to be a paradigm example of what Lewis 
(1979b) calls "conversational scorekeeping". Though I think that the answer given in the 
text is sufficient to meet he objections, discussions with Wolfgang Spohn have convinced 
me that there is a further difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals. In
my opinion, both obey the same form of the (Strong) Ramsey test, but the methods of 
revision differ. As regards the indicative case, one has to imagine that one really gets the 
antecedent as a new incontestable piece of information, and the revision is based on a 
relation of epistemic importance reflecting degrees of confirmation. In the subjunctive 
case, one has to assume the antecedent for hypothesis, with the epistemic importance 
involving considerations of the kind discussed by Lewis (1979a). 
J9 Of course, ~ can be read as i f . . .  may as well. 
2o I grant that (48) is certainly much more an assertability condition than an acceptance 
condition, since for instance A ~ B e K and A o ~ ~ B ~ K cannot hold at the same 
time. (I am indebted to Peter Giirdenfors for this observation.) 
21 Cf. Goodman's (1954, note 2) hesitation whether to interpret even if as the contradic- 
tory or the contrary of if. His observation that (the subjunctive) Even i rA B is normally 
meant as the negation of the counterfactual I f  A B (Goodman, 1954, pp. 15f; note that 
this is exactly Lewis' (1973a, p. 2) stipulation for might counterfactuals) is not sufficient 
for an account of even if, if the following idea is right: I suggest that the negation of a 
natural language conditional isaccepted iff its accessory conditions are accepted, but its 
principal condition is not; this means, for the case in question, that ~(A r[5]---~ B)e  
K r ~Br  KA & -1A, Be  K (cf. (49)). But the characteristic condition ~Br  KA is 
certainly too weak for Even if A B (instead, the present suggestion confirms Lewis). 
Anyway, as (40)-(42) make the acceptance of Even if A B imply A r K & B ~ K, 
Goodman's proposal to call even if the "semifactual conditional" fits in nicely with my 
theses. Giirdenfors' (1981, p. 209) acceptability condition B ~ (KT~)qA for Even i rA B is 
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also too weak: it is always atisfied if A, 7 A ~ K and B e K, a situation which is necessary 
but not at all sufficient for the indicative ven if. 
22 1 think of something like Van Fraassen's (1980, ch. 5) relation of explanatory 
relevance. 
23 However, if I had followed the lines indicated in note 13, I would have confirmed the 
Rylean idea. 
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